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| Major Ikram Sehgal with Major General Fahim Akhtar an outstanding officer of Sindh Regiment and also colonel in chief of Sindh Regiment at his wartime unit 44 Punjab now known as 4 Sindh.The company which Major Sehgal commanded in the 1971 India Pakistan War has been named as Sehgal Company to honour Major Sehgals war time role. |
Ikram SehgalThursday, June 02, 2011
The Pokhran nuclear explosions by India on May 11 and 13, 1998, plunged Pakistan into a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” crisis. The gloating rhetoric and venom flowing out of the BJP leadership then governing India was startling, if not altogether shocking. Clearly intent on rubbing our noses in the dirt, their rhetoric pushed us into a corner. As a knee-jerk reaction an immediate tit-for-tat nuclear blast was a non-starter. However, the morale of both the military and civilians across the board nosedived within days to an all-time low. It was a Hobson’s choice: unless we reacted, we would not have any credible deterrent; if we did, international condemnation (and sanctions) would swiftly follow.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s single-minded obsession was to get a nuclear deterrent to equal India’s bomb even if we “had to eat grass.” To Nawaz Sharif’s credit, he took the brave decision to carry out the nuclear blast in the face of international pressure. In a perverse way, one must be thankful to the Indians: the Pokhran blasts forced us come out of the nuclear closet, without that cast-iron “casus belli,” we would have had to face the full weight of international retribution. We soon messed up our nuclear “coming out” party. The freezing of all foreign currency accounts within hours of the Chagai blast destroyed our credibility as a financial safe haven, probably for good.
Nawaz Sharif’s economic-oriented vision envisaging rapid development of the socio-economic infrastructure was symbolised by the Islamabad-Lahore Motorway. However, he could not quite reconcile to his businessmen colleagues (and himself) paying the taxes that make up the revenues for running any country. At his urging, Moinuddin Khan had abandoned a seven-figure salary with Standard Chartered Bank in Hong Kong to become chairman of the CBR (now FBR). He died of a broken heart at this rank duplicity. Sharif talked the good talk about the economic reforms crafted by Sartaj Aziz but failed to implement them because of political and personal compulsions. Musharraf’s economic golden years of the early 2000s was possible only because of (1) Nawaz Sharif’s policies being implemented, and (2) hard cash in US military aid to Pakistan after the 9/11 attacks being diverted to budgetary support. The ultimate tragedy is the perception of our armed forces gobbling up the more than $10 billon received from the US for military hardware. Actual figures show they got less than 15 percent, 85 percent went to support the consumer-friendly budget sustaining the “feel good” economic environment prevalent. Musharraf allowed the master of PR, Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz, to short-change the defence services so that he could look good as the leader of an upwardly mobile “economically prosperous” country.
Both Mian Nawaz Sharif and Musharraf have a lot in common. Counting on the notoriously short memories of the Pakistani public, they conveniently gloss over their repeated faux pas. In Sharif’s case the infamous “yellow cabs” scheme, in Musharraf’s case, Kargil. Neither Sharif nor Musharraf belonged to the landed gentry or had any background of politics, and both are products of the army. While berating the military, Mian Sahib conveniently forgets he came into politics because of the direct patronage of Zia’s martial law.
It is not unusual in South Asia for individuals to turn upon their benefactors and biting the hand that fed you. As prime minister, Sharif fell out with five successive army chiefs, Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, Gen Asif Nawaz (died in office) and Gen Waheed Kakar in his first tenure. During his second stint as prime minister, Gen Karamat was retired early for advocating the National Security Council. Sharif interpreted this as a conspiracy by the military for a more active role in Pakistani politics. Superseding the far more deserving (and nominally senior) Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan, he appointed Musharraf as COAS. When he attempted to remove Musharraf on Oct 12, 1999, Sharif’s action backfired. While he does have a genuine grouse against Musharraf for the counter-coup that ousted him as prime minister, why is he persisting in attacking the whole army? Given deep pockets to sustain a battery of lawyers, why doesn’t he go legally after Musharraf? The rest of the generals had no idea about Musharraf’s ambitions. They just did not take kindly to Sharif throwing out one army chief after another.
The Sharifs are blatantly hypocritical about their holier-than-thou stance about the rule of law. In November 1997, PML-N rank and file, bussed in by Shahbaz Sharif from Lahore, physically attacked the Supreme Court, even entering the courtrooms and performing “Bhangra” live on CCTV. “Wikileaks” has revealed that, during Pakistan latest judicial crisis Shahbaz Sharif told US consul general Bryan Hunt in confidence that “even if he was restored, Iftikhar Chaudhry would soon be replaced.”
Abbottabad embarrassed and humiliated Pakistan. Voices were raised across the world for Pakistan to be “punished” for “harbouring” Osama bin Laden for a decade. How come no one raises questions about how Serb general Ratko Mladic, responsible for the genocide of over 8,000 Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica, evaded the dragnet of all Western governments and their intelligence agencies for over 15 years in his cousin’s house in a village in Serbia? And what about his boss Karadzic doing the same for 12 years, even running a medical clinic in the centre of Belgrade? The US should reveal the contents of the computer discs and hard discs the Seals unit removed from the Bin Laden compound that clearly is the “smoking gun” about the purported “official” or “unofficial” support for Bin Laden in Pakistan. Accessories to the murder of over 40,000 Pakistanis, we need the names of these despicable characters.
With Imran Khan’s appeal spreading far and wide, particularly among newly registered young voters, Mian Nawaz Sharif’s latest political forays represent a rather belated change of heart (nothing to do with the recent heart procedure he had in London). By clambering onto the bandwagon of the causes Imran Khan has been espousing, Mian Sahib is vainly attempting to steal Imran Khan’s thunder.
The Indian deployment on our eastern borders constitutes more than four times our total strength, further depleted by the moving of some of our operational reserves to fight counterinsurgency operations. Does Nawaz Sharif understand the dangerous implications of India operationalising its Cold Start doctrine? The same man who stood tall on May 28, 1998, now says that India “is not our enemy.” There is a limit to appeasement. Mian Sahib needs to read up about Munich.
Pakistan should be thankful for the deterrent value of the nuclear bomb. While May 28, 1998, was certainly his finest hour, his reputation has gone downhill since (not counting the “breakout” from Raiwind on March 16, 2009, that led to the restoration of the chief justice). Will the real Mian Nawaz Sharif please stand up and be counted for what he really stands for?
The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s single-minded obsession was to get a nuclear deterrent to equal India’s bomb even if we “had to eat grass.” To Nawaz Sharif’s credit, he took the brave decision to carry out the nuclear blast in the face of international pressure. In a perverse way, one must be thankful to the Indians: the Pokhran blasts forced us come out of the nuclear closet, without that cast-iron “casus belli,” we would have had to face the full weight of international retribution. We soon messed up our nuclear “coming out” party. The freezing of all foreign currency accounts within hours of the Chagai blast destroyed our credibility as a financial safe haven, probably for good.
Nawaz Sharif’s economic-oriented vision envisaging rapid development of the socio-economic infrastructure was symbolised by the Islamabad-Lahore Motorway. However, he could not quite reconcile to his businessmen colleagues (and himself) paying the taxes that make up the revenues for running any country. At his urging, Moinuddin Khan had abandoned a seven-figure salary with Standard Chartered Bank in Hong Kong to become chairman of the CBR (now FBR). He died of a broken heart at this rank duplicity. Sharif talked the good talk about the economic reforms crafted by Sartaj Aziz but failed to implement them because of political and personal compulsions. Musharraf’s economic golden years of the early 2000s was possible only because of (1) Nawaz Sharif’s policies being implemented, and (2) hard cash in US military aid to Pakistan after the 9/11 attacks being diverted to budgetary support. The ultimate tragedy is the perception of our armed forces gobbling up the more than $10 billon received from the US for military hardware. Actual figures show they got less than 15 percent, 85 percent went to support the consumer-friendly budget sustaining the “feel good” economic environment prevalent. Musharraf allowed the master of PR, Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz, to short-change the defence services so that he could look good as the leader of an upwardly mobile “economically prosperous” country.
Both Mian Nawaz Sharif and Musharraf have a lot in common. Counting on the notoriously short memories of the Pakistani public, they conveniently gloss over their repeated faux pas. In Sharif’s case the infamous “yellow cabs” scheme, in Musharraf’s case, Kargil. Neither Sharif nor Musharraf belonged to the landed gentry or had any background of politics, and both are products of the army. While berating the military, Mian Sahib conveniently forgets he came into politics because of the direct patronage of Zia’s martial law.
It is not unusual in South Asia for individuals to turn upon their benefactors and biting the hand that fed you. As prime minister, Sharif fell out with five successive army chiefs, Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, Gen Asif Nawaz (died in office) and Gen Waheed Kakar in his first tenure. During his second stint as prime minister, Gen Karamat was retired early for advocating the National Security Council. Sharif interpreted this as a conspiracy by the military for a more active role in Pakistani politics. Superseding the far more deserving (and nominally senior) Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan, he appointed Musharraf as COAS. When he attempted to remove Musharraf on Oct 12, 1999, Sharif’s action backfired. While he does have a genuine grouse against Musharraf for the counter-coup that ousted him as prime minister, why is he persisting in attacking the whole army? Given deep pockets to sustain a battery of lawyers, why doesn’t he go legally after Musharraf? The rest of the generals had no idea about Musharraf’s ambitions. They just did not take kindly to Sharif throwing out one army chief after another.
The Sharifs are blatantly hypocritical about their holier-than-thou stance about the rule of law. In November 1997, PML-N rank and file, bussed in by Shahbaz Sharif from Lahore, physically attacked the Supreme Court, even entering the courtrooms and performing “Bhangra” live on CCTV. “Wikileaks” has revealed that, during Pakistan latest judicial crisis Shahbaz Sharif told US consul general Bryan Hunt in confidence that “even if he was restored, Iftikhar Chaudhry would soon be replaced.”
Abbottabad embarrassed and humiliated Pakistan. Voices were raised across the world for Pakistan to be “punished” for “harbouring” Osama bin Laden for a decade. How come no one raises questions about how Serb general Ratko Mladic, responsible for the genocide of over 8,000 Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica, evaded the dragnet of all Western governments and their intelligence agencies for over 15 years in his cousin’s house in a village in Serbia? And what about his boss Karadzic doing the same for 12 years, even running a medical clinic in the centre of Belgrade? The US should reveal the contents of the computer discs and hard discs the Seals unit removed from the Bin Laden compound that clearly is the “smoking gun” about the purported “official” or “unofficial” support for Bin Laden in Pakistan. Accessories to the murder of over 40,000 Pakistanis, we need the names of these despicable characters.
With Imran Khan’s appeal spreading far and wide, particularly among newly registered young voters, Mian Nawaz Sharif’s latest political forays represent a rather belated change of heart (nothing to do with the recent heart procedure he had in London). By clambering onto the bandwagon of the causes Imran Khan has been espousing, Mian Sahib is vainly attempting to steal Imran Khan’s thunder.
The Indian deployment on our eastern borders constitutes more than four times our total strength, further depleted by the moving of some of our operational reserves to fight counterinsurgency operations. Does Nawaz Sharif understand the dangerous implications of India operationalising its Cold Start doctrine? The same man who stood tall on May 28, 1998, now says that India “is not our enemy.” There is a limit to appeasement. Mian Sahib needs to read up about Munich.
Pakistan should be thankful for the deterrent value of the nuclear bomb. While May 28, 1998, was certainly his finest hour, his reputation has gone downhill since (not counting the “breakout” from Raiwind on March 16, 2009, that led to the restoration of the chief justice). Will the real Mian Nawaz Sharif please stand up and be counted for what he really stands for?
The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com
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